Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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THE UNITED KINGDOM'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1985-90

1. The first session of the Preparatory Committee (May 1989) issued an invitation to "the Nuclear-Weapon States and other parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to provide, sufficiently in advance of the Review Conference, information relevant to the implementation of various articles of the Treaty, including especially Article VI" (Progress Report, paragraph 14). In accordance with this recommendation the United Kingdom has compiled the following statements on its implementation of the Treaty for the period 1985-90.

Article 1

2. Under Article 1 "Each nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices".

3. This obligation has been faithfully observed. In March 1976 Mr James Callaghan, the then Foreign Secretary, stated that the United Kingdom's first consideration (where the export of nuclear equipment, materials or technology were involved) would always be "the provision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Euratom Treaty; and whether or not the prospective customer has concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency." The

"Callaghan Guidelines" continue to govern the United Kingdom's nuclear export policy which is implemented through the Export of Goods (Control) Order and our adherence to the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines (Infcirc/254). The overall objective is to ensure that all nuclear material transferred by the United Kingdom to Non Nuclear Weapon States is used solely for peaceful, non-explosive purposes.

Article III

4. Article III is judged by the United Kingdom to be a vital part of the NPT. The application of international safeguards is crucial for the verification of Articles I and II. The United Kingdom has fully cooperated with the IAEA in the operation of the safeguards system and has voluntarily agreed to place its civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. All civil nuclear material in the UK is subject to the terms of the IAEA/Euratom/UK Safeguards Agreement and to Euratom safeguards. Stocks and movements of civil nuclear material are reported to the IAEA via Euratom. By means of technical support and participation in working groups the United Kingdom has assisted the Agency in its efforts to improve the system. All UK exports to non-nuclear weapon states of source or special fissionable material and of equipment designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of such special fissionable material are conditional on the source or special fissionable material being subject to the appropriate safeguards agreements. The United Kingdom supports and takes an active role in the work of the Committee of NPT parties which has produced lists of items whose export should trigger the application of IAEA safeguards in accordance with Article III.2. The results of the Committee's work have been reported to members of the IAEA in INFCIRC/209.

Article IV

5. The United Kingdom takes seriously its obligations under Article IV. The United Kingdom's contribution to the IAEA's

Technical Assistance and Cooperation (TAC) Fund has steadily increased from $1.2million in 1985 to $2.0 million in 1989. In addition, the United Kingdom will have contributed over £2 million in the period 1986-91 to Footnote A projects aimed at NPT developing member states under the IAEA's technical assistance programme. The United Kingdom also plans to make available further funds of up to £2.5 million to be spread over the next five years. This is an important step in ensuring the continuation of these projects, which are a useful ir ntive to adherence to the NPT.

Article V

6. The United Kingdom has not detonated any nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and consequently is not able to make available to any states any information deriving from such explosions. It is the United Kingdom's opinion that there is no useful role for peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) as any benefits can be achieved in other ways.

Article VI

7. The United Kingdom is firmly committed to the goals of this important article.

8. It welcomes the progress toward a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty which the United States and the Soviet Union were able to announce on 1 June 1990 during the Washington Summit. It welcomes also the Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability. The completion of the START treaty and the subsequent follow-on negotiations are generally recognised to be the essential next steps in the further pursuit of strategic nuclear arms control.

9. With respect to the theatre nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom played a full part in the NATO consultations which contributed to the conclusion of the INF treaty between the

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United States and the Soviet Union. This treaty eliminates all their ground-launched missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 Kms. More than 1,800 Soviet and 800 American missiles are being eliminated in accordance with the treaty's provisions. As a result of the treaty, and of a number of unilateral measures which NATO has also taken, the number of NATO nuclear warheads in Europe is now at a lower level than when the NPT was signed. Further reductions are in prospect as a result of the negotiations on short range nuclear forces which NATO would like to see begin after the signature of the proposed treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The UK intends to play a full and constructive part in NATO consultations on these new SNF negotiations.

10. The United Kingdom welcomes the signature at the Washington Summit of the new verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976. It looks forward to their ratification. A Comprehensive Test Ban remains the United Kingdom's long-term goal. Progress toward this goal can best be made by means of a step-by-step approach. It supports the recent establishment by the Committee on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

11. The United Kingdom also attaches great importance to the pursuit of the non-nuclear arms control measures which are also called for by Article VI of the NPT. The UK therefore welcomes the rapid progress that has been made toward a Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe since the relevant negotiations began in March 1989. The UK is an active participant in these negotiations and attaches the highest importance to their conclusion later this year. It also looks forward to subsequent negotiations on conventional arms control. It welcomes too the talks on confidence and security-building measures which aim to build on what was agreed at Stockholm in September 1986. The United Kingdom also supports the Open Skies concept as a

further measure that would build confidence and assist verification activities.

12. The United Kingdom favours the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable Chemical Weapons Convention. It plays a leading role in the Conference on Disarmament's negotiations on this subject. It welcomes the significant progress made in the US/Soviet bilateral discussions on chemical weapons particularly the recent agreement on the destruction of their CW stocks. This will provide further impetus to the achievement of the global ban on chemical weapons. The United Kingdom also considers it important to maintain and strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. It looks forward to the parties holding a constructive Review Conference in 1991.

13. The United Kingdom urges all parties to the NPT to play a full part in fulfilling their obligations under Article VI and realising the aspirations from which they stem.

Article VII

14. Article VII recognises the right of states to conclude agreements on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. The United Kingdom's position is that each proposed nuclear weapon free zone should be considered on its merits. Their creation can contribute to regional security, non-proliferation and disarmament, but certain criteria need to be met in order to ensure that the balance of security in any zone is maintained. Where nuclear weapons do not already feature in the security of the region concerned and where all states in the region are prepared to participate on the basis of agreements freely entered into and where the general principles of international law and behaviour are recognised the United Kingdom may be prepared to support these efforts. The United Kingdom has for example ratified the protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and is now in the process of negotiating IAEA and Euratom safeguards for those

territories within the Tlatelolco Treaty Zone for which she is de jure or de facto internationally responsible. While not acceding to the Treaty of Raratonga, the United Kingdom respects the intentions of the regional states as set out in Protocol I.

Article VIII

15. In our role as a depositary power government of the NPT we intend to play our full part in a thorough review of the achievement of the purposes of the Preamble at the 1990 NPT Review Conference which we have assisted in convening and in the fulfilment of all the provisions of this Article.

Article IX

16. As a depositary power the United Kingdom has promptly informed all signatory and acceding states of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession which it has received. Since the 1985 NPT Review Conference the following states have deposited their instrument of ratification in London:

1986 Colombia
1986 Malawi
1986 Trinidad and Tobago
1987 Spain
1989 Qatar

17. The security of all states would be enhanced if there were universal adherence to the Treaty. The United Kingdom attaches great importance to the widest possible adherence to the Treaty and has taken every suitable opportunity to encourage non-parties to join.

NON-PROLIFERATION & DEFENCE DEPT
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